Core of an economy and Walras equilibria are considered for a product space X × [0, 1] using the Choquet integral with respect to a fuzzy measure.
Introduction
The Choquet integral, introduced by G. Choquet in 1953 ([20] ), gives a method to integrate functions with respect to non necessarily additive measures such as capacities or, more generally, fuzzy measures ( [9-11, 14, 15, 29, 30, 32-34, 37, 40] ). Besides its initial applications in potential theory and statistical mechanics it became a useful tool to deal with uncertainty in imprecise probability theory, in decision theory and in the study of cooperative games ( [22, 23, 36, 39, 44] ). The Choquet integral has applications also in finance, economics and insurance. One of the central problems in Mathematical Economics is the search of equilibria for the model; in the finitely additive framework results are given in [1-3, 5-8, 43] . In this research, we assume that the space of agents is decomposed into a large number of sections, each of which is an authonomous economic model, but coalitions can be created also among members of different sections, according with some rules. The mathematical model is a product space X * := X × [0, 1], where the sections are the sets X × {y}, as y ranges in [0, 1] . The set X represents the typical section of agents, and is endowed with a σ-algebra A, while in the [0, 1] space the usual Lebesgue σ-algebra B and measure λ are fixed. In each section X × {y} the obvious σ-algebra A × {y} is considered, with a fuzzy measure µ y defined there. The coalitions are all the sets of the product σ-algebra H generated by A and the Borel σ-algebra B , and the fuzzy measure m : H → R + 0 is defined by integrating the measures µ y with respect to the Lebesgue measure in [0, 1] . This model includes the case in which the sections are just a finite number of sets, E 1 , ..., E r , and µ is additive along them. Indeed, in that case it will suffice to define X as the union of these sets, and to decompose [0, 1] into r subintervals J i (such that λ(J i ) = µ(E i )), in each point y of which the measure µ y is null outside the set E i × {y} and coincides with µ µ(E i ) in the measurable subsets of E i × {y}.
Preliminaries and definitions
In R n we shall denote by R n + the positive orthant, and by (R n + )
• its interior. Also we shall denote by ≤ the usual order between numbers, and by ≪ the usual partial order between vectors in R n . Let (X, A) be a measurable space.
Definition 2.1. (Murofushi and Sugeno [37] ) A fuzzy measure on a measurable space (X, A) is a set function µ : A → R + 0 with the properties: • µ(∅) = 0; µ(X) < +∞;
• if A ⊂ B, then µ(A) ≤ µ(B) (monotonicity).
A fuzzy measure µ is subadditive if µ(A ∪ B) ≤ µ(A) + µ(B) for all elements A, B from A. A subadditive fuzzy measure will be also called a submeasure.
Submeasures are also called capacities, for an overview of the topic see for example [4, 40] .
We now recall the concept of a semiconvex submeasure: 
Definition 2.3. Given a fuzzy measure µ : A → R + 0 , (not necessarily sub-additive), we say that it is filtering if, for every element A ∈ A there exists an increasing family (A t ) t∈ [0, 1] of measurable subsets of A, such that (2.2.i)-(2.2.iiii) above hold true.
Remark 2.4. In this case, the range of µ A , namely of the measure µ restricted to A is [0, µ(A)], for every measurable A ⊂ X. Moreover, given a family {µ y , y ∈ Y} of fuzzy measures on A, we say that they are uniformly filtering if for each element A ∈ A the same filtering family can be found, for all µ y .
A nontrivial example can be given as follows: Let X 0 = [0, 1], and assume that A is the family of all subsets of X 0 . It is well-known that there exist additive positive measures on X 0 (not σ-additive) extending the Lebesgue measure λ to A: see e.g. [16, Theorem 1.3] and related bibliography [27, 38] ; similar questions were discussed also in [21] . Denote by µ 0 any of these measures, and set, for every y ∈]0, 1], µ y (A) = µ 0 (A) y : clearly, µ y is a fuzzy measure on X 0 , not additive in general and it is filtering, because of continuity. Now, let X = X 0 ×]0, 1] and define, for each E ⊂ X µ *
where E y := {x ∈ X 0 : (x, y) ∈ E)}. Clearly, for each t ∈ [0, 1], each y and every E there exists a subset
as requested for uniform filtering. We might be wondering if any classical σ-additive measure µ with range [0, µ(X)] has a filtering family satisfying (2.2.iiii). The answer is negative, since this condition for scalar measure is strictly related to the notion of continuity ([17, Definition 1.2]: for every ε > 0 there exists a finite partition of X :
and it does not follow in general from the additivity of the measure. In fact, if we consider X = N and the measure
1 E (n) 2 n ; this measure is σ-additive with arcwiseconnected range (R(µ) = [0, 1]) but it is not continuous in the sense of [17, Definition 1.2] and so the condition (2.2.iiii) is not fulfilled. If the target space is infinite dimensional the situation is even worse, in fact the continuity does not imply the semiconvexity and then the convexity of the range ( [17] ).
The Choquet integral and its properties
Let (X, A, µ) be a fuzzy measure space.
0 is said to be measurable if the set {x ∈ X| f (x) > t} is in A for every t > 0. Any set of that type will be often denoted as [ f > t]. The Choquet integral of a measurable function f is defined by
where the latter integral is in the Riemann sense. We say that f ∈ L 
(horizontal additivity) There is a huge literature concerning (3.1.vi) and its consequences; an interesting result on additivity is contained in [35] where theŠipoš and the Choquet integrals are compared and the additivity of the integrals are examined on some subspaces. Now, we shall introduce a class of fuzzy measures, that in some sense can be considered as averages of other fuzzy measures on the space X. In particular, we shall assume the following, which will be kept for all the sequel. From now on the measure m will be decomposable. 
for all x and all y. If this is the case, we say that ϕ is the section function of f . Usually, when this is the case, we shall also write f (y) rather than f (x, y), thus identifying f and ϕ.
A kind of Fubini Theorem can be deduced for an arbitrary non-negative integrable mapping f , asserting that the integral of f is obtained as an iterated one. We first prove a technical result of joint measurability for real-valued functions. Then g is jointly measurable in (t, y).
Proof. For each index j from 1 to k choose arbitrarily a point t j ∈ E j . For each positive τ, set
for each fixed y, the y-section A(τ) y is an element of the finite algebra in [a, b] generated by the sets E j . Now, denoting by F 1 , ...F K the elements of this algebra, and setting 
shows measurability of the set A(τ).
Proof. We first assume that f is bounded:
Of course, g is decreasing in t. By means of dyadic partitions
, it is easy to construct two sequences, (g n ) n and (g n ) n of step functions, such that for each n and y the mapping g n (t; y) is constant in each dyadic interval, and equal to the value of g(·, y) at the right endpoint of the interval, while g n (t; y) equals the value of g(·, y) at the left endpoint. In such a way, we have
for all n, y and t. We also point out that the mappings g n and g n (considered as depending on t and y), are B 2 -measurable: this follows from Lemma 3.4, since (3.4-ii) is satisfied by construction an (3.4-i) follows from integrability of f and definition of m. Since g is continuous in t for all t except a countable set, we can deduce that both sequences (g n ) n and (g n ) n converge to g except for a countable set of values t (possibly depending on y). Then, denoting by g and g respectively the limits of g n and g n , and using dominated convergence, we see that
holds, for all y. Moreover, the functions g and g are B 2 -measurable, as limits of sequences of mappings of this type. Thanks to Fubini's Theorem and to convergence in L 1 , we now deduce that
On the other hand,
Comparing the two inequalities found, we obtain the assertion, for bounded f . Now, if f is unbounded, it is easy to reach the conclusion, by setting f n = f ∧ n for each integer n, and observing that
for each fixed y, from which
by monotone convergence. 
where as usual H y denotes the y-section of H.
Proof. Let f : X * → R + 0 be any sectional integrable map, f (x, y) = f (y), and choose arbitrarily any measurable set H ⊂ X * . Then
Thanks to Theorem 3.5, we get
where H y = {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ H}. Since the inner integrand is independent on x, we obtain
as announced.
Remark 3.7. Another consequence of Theorem 3.5 is the following. If two integrable functions f 1 , f 2 are comonotonic with respect to x for every y ∈ [0, 1], then
In particular, If f 1 , f 2 are sectional and integrable functions and
For measurable vector functions f : X * → R n + , the Choquet integral is defined componentwise, so it is an n-dimensional vector too. Assuming that m is decomposable, we first prove the following result: 
Proof. If f is sectional then its components are sectional too and so it is enough to apply (3.2) of Remark 3.7.
The additivity obtained in Propostion 3.8 can be extended to functions f (x, y) = g(x)h(y) for suitable g and h. 
Proof. First, we observe that the conclusion can be easily obtained, when g = c1 H , where c is any positive real constant and H is any measurable subset of X, i.e.
Now, when g is any simple function, with decreasing representation g = i c i 1 H i , one has
thanks to Theorem 3.5. But we have
by virtue of (3.3). Finally, if g is any bounded measurable function, it can be uniformly approximated by an increasing sequence of simple functions (g n ) n ; then, by the properties of the Choquet integral, one has that
and finally
follows from the previous step.
Our next goal is to prove that, in case f : X * → R n + is sectional, and if m is a decomposable fuzzy measure of a special type, then the set R( f ) := { H f dm : H ∈ H} is convex. We need the following We observe that m is of convex type if all measures µ y coincide with a semiconvex submeasure µ on X, or in the particular case of a finite number of sections as described in the Introduction.
We shall also make use of the following Lemma. 
Proof. Since 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, it is possible to construct an increasing sequence (s k ) k of simple functions converging to τ, and a decreasing sequence (S k ) k of simple functions, also converging to τ. Moreover, these sequences can be based on the same partitions of [0, 1], built in a diadic way. So we can write
Thanks to the convex-type hypothesis, there exists a filtering family (X t ) t∈ [0, 1] in X, satisfying (2.2-i,ii,iii) simultaneously for all the measures µ y . So we can set, for each k:
Clearly, the sets E k and F k belong to H, and we have
for all k and y. Now, setting E = E k , F = F k , both E and F belong to H, and E ⊂ F. By monotonicity, we have then
and
Comparing these inequalities, and recalling that E ⊂ F, we can conclude that
for all y. So, any of the sets E or F is as requested. Proof. As usual we shall identify f with its (vector) section function, and fix any element H ∈ H. We have, from Corollary 3.6:
More precisely, for any y ∈ [0, 1], set
clearly, Λ is measurable, and H f dm = 1 0 Λ(y)dy. Since µ y (H y ) ≤ µ y (X), the vector Λ(y) lies in the line segment joining the origin O with the vector µ y (X) f (y). So, if we denote this segment by S (y), it is clear that H f dm ∈ 1 0 S (y)dy, where the latter is an Aumann integral, i.e. the set of all integrals of measurable selections from y → S (y): from now on, we shall denote by D this Aumann integral. Since D is clearly convex, if we prove that R( f ) = D the proof is complete. But we have already seen that R( f ) ⊂ D, so it only remains to show the converse. To this aim, let us fix any measurable selection σ(y) from S (y). Then, for all y there exists a real number τ(y) ∈ [0, 1] such that (componentwise)
The mapping τ can be taken measurable: indeed, let i be any index for which f i (y) 0; then
and this value is independent of i. Otherwise, if f i (y) = 0 we can choose τ as in the previous case, since its value is immaterial. Now, since 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, thanks to Lemma 3.11, we can find a measurable set E ∈ H such that µ y (E y ) = τ(y)µ y (X) for all y ∈ [0, 1], and so, componentwise:
Since σ was arbitrary, this shows that D ⊂ R( f ), and the proof is finished.
Applications to equilibria
We shall now introduce our economic model. For vector measurable functions f = ( f 1 , . . . f n ) : X * → R n + we consider the monotone integral, and we shall keep the notation f dm, as the vector f dm = f 1 dm, . . . , f n dm . Sometimes we shall denote by a the generic element (x, y) ∈ X * , and shall also use the notation
We define a pure exchange economy to be a 4-tuple
where: -the space of agents is a triple (X * , H, m), with (X * , H) a measurable space and m is a fuzzy measure of convex type. Moreover we shall require that each m is a submodular and the ideal of m-null sets is stable under countable unions. Under these conditions (see [24, 41] ) the Choquet integral for scalar non-negative functions satisfies the following requirements:
We shall also assume here that µ y (X) = m(X * ) = 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1]. -the target space R n is the commodity space, and its positive cone R n + is called the consumption set of each agent; -e :
is the initial endowment density and e(a) := e(x, y) ≫ 0 m-a.e.; we shall always assume that e is sectional.
-{≻ a } a is the preference relation associated to the generic agent a ∈ X * . Let us introduce the classical concepts of equilibrium theory in this new setting. -An allocation is a measurable function f : X * −→ R n + ; an allocation is feasible if
10
-A price is any element p ∈ R n + \ {0}. -The budget set of an agent a ∈ X * for the price p is B p (a) = {x ∈ R n + : px ≤ pe(a)}. -A coalition is any measurable subset S of X * with m(S ) > 0. -We say that the coalition S can improve the allocation f if there exists an allocation g such that
-The core of E, denoted by C(E), is the set of all the feasible allocations that cannot be improved by any coalition.
-We say that the coalition S strongly improves the allocation f if there exists an allocation g such that -The large core of E, denoted by LC(E), is the set of all the feasible allocations that cannot be strongly improved by any coalition. Of course,
-A walrasian allocation is a feasible allocation f such that there exists a price p so that the pair ( f, p) is a Walras equilibrium. W(E) is the set of all the walrasian allocations of E.
Our aim is to obtain relations between Walras equilibria W(E) and core of an economy C(E). In order to study relations between C(E) and W(E), we observe that
Theorem 4.2. Under the assumptions 4.1 the inclusion C(E) ⊃ W(E) holds true.
Proof. The proof is analogous to [41, Theorem 3.2] and it is reported here for the sake of completeness. Let f ∈ W(E) \ C(E). Then there exist a coalition S and a feasible allocation g such that m-a.e. in S g(a) ≻ a f (a) and S gdm = S e dm. On the other side there exists a price p for
Hence m-a.e. in S one has:
whence, by Proposition 3.8
On the other side, as we have assumed that g improves f , from subadditivity we have:
thus contradicting (4.1).
Assumption 4.3. Suppose now that f is sectional, so that f (a) = f (x, y) = f (y) and consider the multifunction
where the C y ′ s are convex, closed and contain the sets u
The class of its Choquet integrable selections is S
So Γ f contains as selections all functions that are µ y -a.e. constant in X × {y} (the constant must be an element of C y ). So all integrable functions of the type γ(x, y) = c(y), c(y) ∈ C y , are Choquet integrable selections of Γ.
Now, in order to prove the convexity of I f we need some preliminary results; the first is a density result of the multivalued integral of Γ. Proof. Let A ∈ H and s ∈ S * Γ be fixed. For each y, let us define
in case µ y (A y ) > 0. Otherwise we can set ϕ(y) equal to any arbitrary selection of y → C y . Indeed, we see that
where K denotes the set of all y
thanks to Corollary 3.6, and so
It only remains to show that ϕ(y) ∈ C y , for each y ∈ K. To this aim, fix y ∈ K and assume by contradiction that the quantity ϕ(y) does not belong to C y . Then, by the Separation Theorem, there exist a positive element p ∈ R n and a real number a such that
But then, by subadditivity, we get
Now, for every x ∈ X we have s(x, y) ∈ C y , and so
13 from this we deduce
This is clearly absurd, and the assertion is proved.
Using Lemma 4.4 we now prove the main convexity theorem. Thanks to Lemma 3.11, we see that there exists a measurable set A ∈ H such that τ(y) = µ y (A y ) for all y, and so
This proves also the reverse inclusion. Now, we shall prove that Then we have
Let us set
Then, it is clear that τ is a measurable mapping with values in [0, 1] and s is a measurable function, such that s(y) ∈ C y for all y: moreover, it is clear from the previous calculations that
So, we have proved also that the set 1 0 I(y)dy is convex, which concludes the proof.
In analogy with our previous notation, let R(λ) denote the range of the set function λ, namely R(λ) = λ(A). So we have proved that the coalition A ′ strongly improves f by the allocation s 0 . But this is impossible, since f ∈ LC(E).
Since both sets are convex, and the second one has non-empty interior, we can apply the Strong Separation Theorem, and determine some p ∈ R n p 0 such that p · z ≥ 0 for all z ∈ I f . It only remains to prove that p ∈ R n + . Indeed, we have that (
We shall now prove that:
, where p is as in Lemma 4.6 Proof. Let B := {y ∈ [0, 1] : p · f (y) < p · e(y)}. Since µ y (X) = m(X * ) = 1 and f and e are sectional, we have
So, by Corollary 3.6 and Remark 3.7, it follows
where z = X×B f dm − X×B edm is an element of I f . Therefore p · z < 0, which is in contrast with Lemma 4.6.
Theorem 4.8. Under the previous assumptions, if f is a sectional allocation, then f ∈ LC(E) if and only if f ∈ W(E).
Proof. We have already seen that W(E) ⊂ C(E), thanks to Theorem 4.2. To prove the converse inclusion fix f ∈ LC(E). By Lemma 4.7 m a.e. in X * , p · e(a) ≤ p · f (a). We shall now prove that the previous inequality is in fact an equality. For A ⊂ X * , being f feasible and since p· f − p·e ≥ 0 m-a.e., we derive by Proposition 3.8 and (3.2)
Applying (c 2 ) (pag. 10), we get p · f = p · e m-a.e. in X. The remaining part of the proof is exactly the same as that of [28, Theorem 2.1.1, pag 133 ff] since preferences are assumed to be monotone and continuous.
Assume now that the preferences have the following structure:
• for every y ∈ [0, 1], there exists a subset J y of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that: i) for every u, v ∈ R n + , u ≻ a=(x,y) v ⇐⇒ u j > v j , j ∈ J y ; ii) For every j ∈ {1, ..., n}, the set A j := {y ∈ [0, 1] : j ∈ J y } is measurable.
This means that within each coalition E k only the items of the k-th list J k are considered, in order to decide whether a bundle is preferred to another. Observe that such assumption does not fulfill monotonicity, in the sense of (4.1.3b), but it satisfies the more demanding form
• for every x ∈ R n + , z ∈ (R n + ) 0 , then x + z ≻ a x for every a ∈ X.
However Lemma 4.6 remains true: one has only to note that I ∩ (−R n + ) 0 = ∅ with the same proof. We note that, from (i) and (ii) above, it follows that there exists k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that λ(A k ) > 0. 
Conclusions
The Choquet integral over a product space X * and with values in R n + has been studied with respect to a fuzzy measure. Under suitable conditions a Fubini theorem is obtained and these results are used to find equilibria in a pure exchange economy E = {(X * , H, m); R n + ; e; {≻ a } a∈X * },where the space of agents is a triple (X * , H, m), with (X * , H) a measurable space and m is a fuzzy measure of convex type. If the target space is infinite dimensional vector lattices are candidates for the space of goods. In this framework one could consider also the methods of integration given in [12, 13, 18, 19, 24, 26, 42] .
